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1. Introduction

Millicom’s 2020 Law Enforcement Disclosure (LED) report summarizes the extent and context of our interactions with law enforcement agencies and governments on issues that affect the privacy or freedom of expression (FoE) of our customers.

In a year of unprecedented challenges and opportunities, privacy and FoE remain among the most material and relevant topics for companies that provide communications services. The COVID-19 pandemic caused tremendous disruption within the context of an already rapidly changing technology environment. As governments grappled with containing the outbreak of the virus in their countries, many looked to technology as a means of controlling and mitigating its effects. A proliferation of contact-tracing apps and digital health solutions emerged globally, some of which provoked privacy and surveillance concerns. Millicom has remained steadfast in our approach with governments and consistently disposed to provide crucial support where needed, while also never compromising our principles and values as they relate to privacy and FoE rights.

Since 2015, Millicom has produced an annual LED report in line with our desire to be as transparent as possible with our customers in how we handle government requests for their data, the challenges we face from time to time in dealing with government requests, and the manner in which we manage these challenges. In this report, we also set out our ongoing commitment and progress in the areas of privacy and FoE, how our operations may impact human rights more generally, and how we work independently and with others to minimize potential negative impacts. We issue this report in both English and Spanish, given that our business is focused primarily in Latin America.

Our business success relies on customers’ trust in us to respect their privacy and freedom of expression, which also goes hand-in-hand with our duty to respect international norms as well as local laws in the countries where we operate. This is why, in 2013, Millicom became a founding member of the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue (TID), a group of telecom operators focused on privacy and FoE issues. Since then, TID has merged with the Global Network Initiative (GNI), which comprises more than 60 member organizations including technology companies, ethical investors, academics and human-rights organizations. Millicom continually seeks to leverage its participation in the GNI in support of freedom of expression and privacy rights in our countries of operation. The GNI positively assessed Millicom’s development in this area in 2019, marking the first time that a telecommunications company was assessed as part of the GNI. Details on our assessment experience are included in our 2019 LED report.

An ever-evolving technology landscape creates greater challenges for our sector, for governments and for law enforcement authorities around the globe. Increasingly, legislators and regulators are grappling with how best to regulate hate speech, remove extremist content and prevent misinformation campaigns while also preserving free speech. The phenomenon of “fake news” or disinformation campaigns via social media—which create tangible impacts on electoral events—is just one example of the challenges emanating from a data-centric society. Security agencies continually push governments to place greater public safety obligations on technology firms. Conventional and established methods and procedures for requesting information related to criminal investigations are becoming outdated.
Moreover, as we edge toward an even more connected future, our values as they pertain to Internet governance will remain crucial for our societies and lives. New technologies such as 5G will continue to get us to a more connected society and will allow the mass development of next-generation applications such as AR, robotics and smart cities. As our lives become increasingly digitized, and enhanced connectivity drives a greater convergence of sectors and technologies, we must work hand-in-hand with legislators, regulators, industry and civil society to ensure we find the right balance in the answers to the big questions ahead.

We must balance our respect for customers’ rights with our duty to comply with local laws in the countries where we operate. These laws require us to disclose information about our customers to law enforcement agencies and other government authorities in connection with their legitimate duty to protect national security and public safety, or to prevent or investigate crimes such as acts of terrorism. Whenever we face a government request for customer information, we seek to minimize the impact of that request on our customers’ right to privacy and FoE. Before we respond to any legal demand, we determine that we have received the correct type of demand based on the applicable law for the type of information sought. Moreover, when any conflict arises between a local law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or other international human rights standards, we strive to resolve that conflict in a way that respects people’s right to privacy and FoE as well as their fundamental right to access the Internet and communications services.

We continually study and implement lessons learned from our industry peers and from stakeholder engagement. We hope this edition of our LED report will contribute to the constructive work among different stakeholder groups to better protect our users’ privacy and FoE.

Luxembourg, February 2021

Karim Lesina
Executive Vice President, Chief External Affairs Officer

Salvador Escalón
Executive Vice President, Chief Legal and Compliance Officer
2. Reporting at Millicom

Millicom is a leading provider of cable and mobile services dedicated to emerging markets. We operate under the Tigo brand in nine countries across Latin America and in Tanzania. We also maintain a presence in Ghana, having decided in 2017 to merge Tigo’s operations in the country with those of Bharti Airtel. Our company sets the pace in providing The Digital Lifestyle® to more than 50 million customers through our high-speed broadband and innovative services.

Our purpose is to build the digital highways that connect people, improve lives and develop our communities. And our mission is to provide the fastest, most secure digital highways so that we become customers’ first choice in all our markets. Millicom shares are listed on Nasdaq Stockholm in the form of Swedish Depository Receipts and on the U.S. Nasdaq Stock Market since January 9, 2019.

We have published an annual LED report since 2015 for two key reasons:

1. To more transparently tell stakeholders how we deal with government requests
2. To more clearly explain the contexts in which telecommunications companies receive demands from governments and the considerations influencing decisions related to these situations

As an operator focused solely on emerging markets, we strive to find the appropriate balance between providing high levels of transparency, complying with applicable laws, and protecting our staff and assets on the ground. In some markets in which we operate, we are legally prohibited from disclosing law enforcement requests for assistance. In other instances, disclosure may place the safety of our staff and assets at risk. With these considerations in mind, we subdivide our reporting into two regions—Central America and South America—to provide more granular and detailed information. Given our reduced presence in Africa, where we now operate only in Tanzania and Ghana, this LED report only covers major events¹ and COVID-19 requests in the Africa region.

What we report

We disclose the types and numbers of law enforcement requests we receive. More importantly, we also describe the overall context and trends reflected in the demands we receive. In specific and significant cases—what we call major events—the context serves to highlight practical challenges that we encounter in our interactions with law enforcement authorities.

We describe several of these major events and, whenever possible, disclose the countries in which they took place.

We disclose information about our internal policies, processes and controls that protect customers’ privacy when we handle law enforcement requests. This report also describes how we seek to minimize unwarranted effects on our customers’ freedom of expression and privacy.

In addition, we include information about the various communications services we provide as well as the number of customers and our market position in each country. These details affect the number of requests we receive and should be considered when assessing the extent of government activities.

What we do not report

For the most part, this report describes our engagement in broad terms rather than detailing specific events. Law enforcement demands are sensitive in nature. In many cases, they relate to confidential court proceedings and to national security and emergency situations where human life is at risk.

Requests from law enforcement come with strict confidentiality requirements. Often, we are prohibited by law from disclosing details about the requests we receive.

Failure to comply with these requirements could lead to severe sanctions for our company and our local staff, including imprisonment.

We have limited ability to publicly discuss how we engage with law enforcement or other authorities when we receive requests, or the ways in which we challenge their approach. Doing so would affect our ability to engage with those authorities in the future and could, in some cases, put personnel at risk. Such limitations are a source of frustration at times, as they may lead to incorrect perceptions of inaction on our part.

Unlike some of our peers who have a different geographic area of operation, we do not disclose the numbers of government requests by country. A major reason for not doing so is that several of our countries of operation prohibit such disclosure. Instead, we split Latin America into Central and South America, which allows for more granularity in the numbers. Generally, the law is either unclear as to whether we can publish the numbers of requests received, or it explicitly prohibits publication.

We have conducted considerable internal risk analysis and debate about publishing country-specific numbers. We operate in some countries where publicly disclosing such numbers is likely to put the safety of our employees at risk. This is not necessarily a risk of action from the government; it could be from criminal entities whom the requests concern. In some countries, even beginning discussions with authorities regarding the disclosure of numbers might, in our risk/benefit assessment, lead to negative outcomes for our operations and our ability to promote more rights-respecting practices.

In previous reports, we disclosed specific information related to one of our operations to provide more granular level data. That section has been replaced in this year’s report for two reasons: this country

¹ Major events include politically motivated requests for (but not limited to): shutdown of our network, service denial or restriction, targeted take down or blocking of content, denial of access for specific individuals with the intent to limit freedom of expression, significant operational changes relating to surveillance techniques, significant changes to local laws relating to government powers of surveillance or data retention, or requests to send politically motivated messages to customers on behalf of the government.
2. Reporting at Millicom—continued

(Colombia) is now producing this information in its own local transparency report, and we have instead included a specific section on the more pertinent topic of COVID-19.

We have worked with our former TID peers and with the law firm Hogan Lovells to create a legal frameworks resource (https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/policy-issues/legal-frameworks/) that details the government surveillance powers in our markets. For this reason, we do not outline specific laws by country in this report.

Definitions of requests

The information, communications and technology (ICT) industry has no agreed-upon definitions or classifications of law enforcement requests. Creating standard definitions is challenging given the multiple jurisdictions and business models in our wider sector. At Millicom, we classify law enforcement requests into three categories: interception, customer metadata and customer financial data (related to the mobile money services or MFS services we provide). Some of our industry peers report in similar categories.

These three categories encompass the vast majority of requests we receive. We report all other requests outside of the definitions below as major events. We do not report specifically on content take down requests, as they are relatively rare in our markets, with the exception of legally mandated removal of access to child sexual abuse content. However, we have seen increasing legislative proposals to mandate or request the take down of illegal online content in recent years. This content often is not under our control and can only be taken down by the host content provider. When applicable, we account for content takedown requests in the Major Events section of this report.

How we obtain the material we report

We receive information on the number of law enforcement demands from the legal and regulatory departments in each of our local operations. As prescribed by our Law Enforcement Assistance and Major Events Guidelines, these departments receive all demands and review their legality before executing the demands.

Our departments log each demand by date, type (see Table 1) and requesting authority. Once a request is legally justified, we provide the information to authorities or undertake the necessary actions.

Information about interception, metadata and mobile money-related requests is collected during our annual corporate responsibility reporting process through Enablon, a dedicated tool into which local legal teams enter total numbers of requests as well as evidence for their aggregated numbers.

We report information related to major events according to an escalation mechanism defined in our Law Enforcement Assistance and Major Events Guidelines.

The Global External Affairs team maintains a log of information about all major events, which are reviewed in our cross-functional LED Committee comprising senior staff from External Affairs, which includes Corporate Responsibility, Security, Legal, Ethics and Compliance functions. ERM Certification and Verification Services (ERM CVS) has assessed Millicom’s numerical information related to law enforcement demands as part of our corporate responsibility reporting limited assurance process, as disclosed in our Annual Report on pages 28-60.

Feedback

We are keen to hear from or work with anyone seeking to promote open access and transparent and accountable processes for surveillance and security. We also welcome feedback on this report or on privacy and FoE issues in general. Please contact CR@millicom.com or locate our full contact details at www.millicom.com.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Request categories</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interception</strong></td>
<td>Interception of voice, SMS, fax and data traffic (lawful interception) in real time; i.e., live surveillance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Customer metadata</strong></td>
<td>Metadata such as call data records, IP addresses, SMS, email traffic, Internet traffic information, documents from Cloud services and requests for location information (physical/base station or GPS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobile money services-related data</strong></td>
<td>Information related to our mobile financial services (MFS), such as transaction data, confirmation that an individual is a mobile money customer, and other account activity. These requests do not always relate to a financial crime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Our governance and engagement

We have long recognized the need to engage civil society, NGOs, investors, customers, academia and subject-matter experts on privacy and FoE to enhance our understanding of human rights risks related to our operations and enact processes to manage those risks.

Our actions to minimize risks where possible include monitoring the effectiveness of Millicom guidelines, adding controls, and improving the readiness of local and global teams to handle any major events along with the human rights and reputational issues that such events pose. We initially focused on improving local processes by providing support to local management and the teams that manage law enforcement relationships. Since then, we have progressed significantly, instilling a culture of respect for privacy and FoE rights throughout our business and acting as a thought leader in emerging markets on these topics.

In 2018, we began our first external GNI Assessment process (discussed in more detail in our 2019 LED report). We also continuously review and strengthen our existing policy framework created in 2015, making updates in line with technological advancements, emerging standards and best practices, and evolving political and security environments in our operations. Finally, our Global Privacy Policy addresses customers’ privacy rights.

Human rights impact and risk

In 2017, the first year of our GNI membership, we carried out a global human rights risk assessment of our operating environment to assess the risk level for major events or other requests that may pose threats to our customers’ rights. We derived the salient and material risks posed by each country from Verisk Maplecroft’s risk indices.²

As part of this risk assessment, we engaged external expert support to evaluate all our policies, practices and resources so that we could better understand our potential risks and our opportunities to improve.

Millicom’s significant on-the-ground presence in our markets gives us a strong understanding of potential risk situations and risk levels. We sought to formalize this assessment and broaden our analysis by interacting with internal and external stakeholder groups to create a dynamic tool that we could update and consult regularly. In 2018, we worked with leading sustainability firm Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) to build a Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) toolkit, which we deployed in our South American operations in 2019. We continue to roll out this assessment across our operations in Central America and have included an executive summary of the results from South America in this report.

BSR also supported us in our most recent Materiality Assessment, convening internal and external stakeholder interviews to help define Millicom’s priorities in the corporate responsibility space. Naturally, privacy and FoE were key areas of focus during this assessment.

Governance and oversight of human rights

Corporate Responsibility is a core function within our External Affairs team. Millicom’s Board of Directors (BoD) and our Executive Team (ET), which includes the EVP Chief External Affairs Officer, oversee our corporate responsibility strategy and activities. The Board receives regular updates on corporate responsibility topics, with Millicom’s CEO, EVP Chief External Affairs Officer, and EVP Chief Legal and Compliance Officer attending the BoD meetings. The EVP Chief External Affairs Officer also reports to the ET on a monthly basis, while Millicom’s Corporate Responsibility Director is responsible for ongoing management of human rights issues in the company.

Our BoD receives periodic updates on human rights issues and has directed management to continue its strong proactive approach, which includes deepening relationships with civil society at the country and global levels. During 2019 and 2020, the BoD received updates on Millicom’s implementation of the GNI Principles and our management of risks related to privacy and FoE from the EVP Chief External Affairs Officer. The BoD’s Compliance and Business Conduct Committee provided additional oversight.

In January 2014, when Millicom began its escalation process for government requests, we established a cross-functional Law Enforcement Disclosure (LED) Committee to better coordinate risk management. This committee is chaired by the EVP Chief External Affairs Officer. It includes the Director of Corporate Responsibility, EVP Chief Legal and Compliance Officer, VP Ethics and Compliance, Chief Information Security Officer, VP General Counsel Corporate and Global Chief Privacy Officer, and our Regulatory Affairs Directors. LED Committee members prepare and jointly approve policies and processes, review our Law Enforcement Assistance and Major Events Guidelines and related risks, and approve Millicom’s reporting and engagement related to privacy and FoE. The LED Committee communicates frequently and met several times in 2020 to review risks and actions related to FoE and privacy. These meetings provided an opportunity to brief new team members on our ongoing work on these issues as well as to help assess and define “Major Events” in our markets. This Committee also provides guidance and input on how Millicom can best approach these issues in both a rights-respecting and law-abiding manner.

² https://maplecroft.com
3. Our governance and engagement—continued

We completed our Global Privacy Policy framework in 2018 and continued to execute it through 2019–20. In addition, we have approved broad privacy principles, guidelines and commitments for the company. At a global level, our Privacy Office is led by our Global Chief Privacy Officer. At a local level, all Tigo operations have a Local Privacy Officer responsible for the administration of privacy matters and local training. Our Millicom and Tigo websites provide information to our customers regarding our Global Privacy Policy and Tigo Privacy Notices, including how we use, process and secure customer data. Our websites also provide channels and contact points for our customers to raise concerns about our policy or their privacy.

Our EVP Chief External Affairs Officer, VP Ethics and Compliance, EVP Chief Technology and Information Officer, EVP Chief Legal and Compliance Officer, VP General Counsel Corporate and Global Chief Privacy Officer monitor the privacy framework development efforts. We continue to roll out this framework internally and externally along with Millicom’s privacy commitments and guiding principles. All relevant information is available in our online privacy policy at http://www.millicom.com/privacy-policy.

Engagement

We work with a wide range of actors to mitigate human rights impacts and risks related to law enforcement requests. Millicom is a founding member of the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue on Freedom of Expression and Privacy; we joined the Global Network Initiative (GNI) as a full member in 2017. We also engage with many international organizations, taking part in various events and contributing to the ongoing debate around FoE and privacy in the context of a rapidly changing technology landscape. We developed and expanded our relationships with civil society actors through our membership in the GNI during 2020, participating in its Policy Committee and Learning Committee to advance mutual interests in the defense of FoE and privacy rights. In addition, we engage as much as possible with governments and other in-country stakeholders on FoE and privacy topics. In 2020, we engaged extensively with NGOs in Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Colombia regarding the assessment of our privacy policy and practices. We seek to enhance governments’ understanding of our obligations outside of their countries. We also seek to highlight risks from disproportionate government action, especially to governments’ reputation and foreign investment possibilities, and discuss these topics with relevant diplomatic representatives.

We conduct similar conversations and trainings with our local staff members who engage with these issues on the ground. A rapidly changing technology environment and high public-security demands can complicate our decision-making process as we strive to adhere to legal obligations and protect the FoE and privacy of users. We provide yearly face-to-face training on these topics with our local staff at regional summits as well as through specific training sessions in different operations as needed.

**Policies, guidelines and controls**

We include a commitment to the International Bill of Human Rights and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in the Millicom Code of Conduct.

In addition, we are committed to implementing the TID’s Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy for the Telecommunications Sector based on our TID membership. Millicom’s LED reports began as a public accounting of our commitment. We now adhere to the GNI Principles on FoE and Privacy and report more extensively on these commitments following our first GNI Assessment process. During 2018, the LED Committee finalized and approved updates to Millicom’s Group Guidelines for Law Enforcement Assistance (LEA) and Major Events, which comprise a streamlined, consolidated version of our various internal policies and work in this area. These guidelines summarize:

- Our obligations within international standards and frameworks
- Roles and responsibilities of each department
- Assessments to be conducted as requests are received
- How to handle urgent and non-written requests
- How to log requests and our responses
- How to protect customer data throughout the process of retrieving information
- How to deliver the information safely

A shortened version of these guidelines are available at https://www.millicom.com/media/3613/law-enforcement-assistance-and-major-events-guidelines.pdf.

We review and revise these guidelines on an ongoing basis. We also consistently train our staff on implementation and developments.

The EVP Chief External Affairs Officer and EVP Chief Legal and Compliance Officer, working with senior members of the Corporate Responsibility and Legal, Ethics and Compliance teams, are ultimately responsible for the company’s implementation of the GNI Principles related to privacy and FoE rights.

Our internal control process assesses how well our local operations apply and comply with various global policies and controls. In 2015, we added two controls related to the implementation of the original LEA Guidelines. The first control verifies that all requests are assessed by the Legal team before execution and that a written copy of the original request is retained on file. The second control relates to limiting and making a log of access to customer data when executing the request. Our operations assess their alignment—or maturity level—with these controls annually. All operations have made substantial improvements in the maturity level of their controls for the LEA guidelines since 2015.

The LED Committee approved Major Events Guidelines in 2015. These guidelines define steps to take in case of a major event, including a regional and global escalation process, as well as practical suggestions for engaging with government authorities to limit the remit and/or timeframe of a major event. In 2020, we built on previous work assessing how to streamline communication of these internal policies, guidelines and controls to our local staff.
After conducting an external benchmarking of how this is done across the industry and deciding to create one authoritative document—the Law Enforcement Assistance and Major Events Guidelines—we discussed and revised the evolving nature of requests and the potential need to update our definitions and guidelines to reflect these evolutions. We do this to ensure our internal resources are easily understood and that they remain relevant in an ever-evolving environment. We train staff members on these topics regularly. We expect to finalize minor updates to our policy framework during 2021.

**Information security**

Millicom, as well as all Tigo operations, protects our networks and customers as one of our highest priorities. Millicom has a dedicated Global Chief Information Security Officer whose team oversees the strategy and direction of all security-related activities across the enterprise. Our global information security program provides policies and standards, vulnerability management and third-party risk management. The program also oversees implementation of technical solutions across the company. The Global CISO regularly reports on new and evolving risks and technology initiatives to the Millicom Board of Directors. Since we operate in many countries around the world, developing a risk framework that can address the various legal and regulatory reporting needs, as well as the unique challenges individual countries face, is paramount. Millicom has implemented a risk framework that is based on a combination of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) as well as the ISO/IEC 27001:2013. This blended approach allows each country to address local regulators in whichever format they prefer while also providing a common risk and maturity measurement across our entire enterprise.
4. Human Rights Impact Assessments (HRIAs)

**Project Overview**

Millicom worked with BSR to undertake human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) of the company’s operations in Colombia, Bolivia and Paraguay. We sought to:

- Identify and prioritize actual and potential human rights impacts, including both risks and opportunities, related to the company’s operations, business relationships, products and services
- Align the company’s policies and practices with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), taking into account its geographic footprint, scale and resources
- Create an action plan to address the impacts; avoid, prevent, or mitigate the risks; and maximize the opportunities
- Build capacity of relevant staff to lead constructive dialogue with rights-holders and stakeholders
- Identify best practices for the governance and management of human rights

**Summary of Human Rights Risks and Opportunities**

- **Risks caused by government overreach and overbroad requests:** The telecommunications industry is highly regulated and often subject to laws and spectrum license terms that require law enforcement to have direct access and to enable broad requests for customer data that may result in human rights violations.

- **Risks related to Millicom’s direct operations:** Millicom also has potential human rights risks related to its operations. These include the labor rights of its employees and contractors, health and safety risks associated with building and maintaining telecommunications infrastructure, and human rights impacts that could arise from ethics breaches and corruption.

- **Risks caused by misuse and abuse of Millicom’s services:** Customers may use the telecommunications and internet services provided by Millicom in ways that harm the rights of others.

Below is a summary of the human rights risks and opportunities identified in this HRIA. The risks are broken down into broad categories of rights. Due to the similar contexts and nature of Millicom’s services in Colombia, Paraguay and Bolivia, most of the risks and opportunities are relevant for all three countries.

It is important to note that the human rights risks identified in this assessment are potential adverse human rights impacts that may happen in the future—this is not a list of actual adverse human rights impacts occurring today. Further, these risks are not unique to Millicom or the markets in Colombia, Paraguay and Bolivia; rather, these risks are commonly found in the telecommunications industry.

- **Privacy and data security:** Millicom possesses a large volume of customer data, and thus it is important to ensure user data is not subject to undue access or misuse, whether by employees, partners, vendors or via third-party cyberattacks. It is also important to address potential legal risks such as broad government requests for data and government abuse of direct access to mobile networks.

- **Freedom of expression and association:** As a telecommunications and internet service provider, Millicom is part of an ecosystem of actors that enable people to exercise their rights to free expression, access to information, and association. To avoid risks to these rights, it is important to address the possibility that Millicom could be ordered by government authorities to remove or block access to legitimate content and shut down some or all of its network.

- **Ethics and corruption:** Ethical breaches and corruption may affect or aggravate negative human rights impacts by preventing people from realizing their rights. Corruption and breaches also may affect the availability, quality and accessibility of services and resources upon which people depend. Vulnerable groups that already face limited options can be especially affected by corruption. Millicom has strong global ethics policies and is part of an ecosystem of actors in the marketplace. To do its part, Millicom should continue its strong global ethics policies.

- **Security services:** Millicom contracts with security services to protect its telecommunications infrastructure. It is important to ensure security personnel uphold the bodily security rights of others if they encounter physical confrontations. Similarly, it is important to ensure bodily security rights of security personnel are themselves safeguarded from harm by others. These risks are heightened in areas affected by conflict and areas with high crime rates.

- **Hate speech and non-discrimination:** These are potential risks in both Millicom’s direct operations and the use of Millicom services by customers. It is important to ensure country offices uphold the employee code of conduct and other relevant policies, as well as foster a strong corporate culture, to uphold employees’ right to non-discrimination. Hate speech and content that intends to harass users is a risk of any social media presence.

- **Child rights:** Children’s rights are particularly at risk due to misuse of information and communication technologies (ICTs). For example, children may be exposed to inappropriate content online, and the Internet may be used by individuals to exploit children; for example, by sharing child sexual abuse material. It is important for Millicom to continue to do its part in fostering a safe online environment for children through education and outreach programs. It is also important to protect children’s rights by ensuring suppliers and contractors are not engaging in child labor or other business practices that may harm children.

- **Labor standards:** To protect the labor rights of both Millicom’s employees and the employees of suppliers and contractors, it is important to ensure compliance with health and safety requirements, prevent people from working excessive hours, and ensure employees are paid a living wage in accordance with local laws and practices.
4. Human Rights Impact Assessments (HRIAs)—continued

Millicom and its suppliers have the opportunity to enhance labor standards through employment opportunities that provide a decent standard of living.

- Land rights and Indigenous Land Rights: Millicom’s infrastructure, whether owned or leased, requires the use of land, and therefore it is important to ensure that land rights are respected during network construction and maintenance. This is particularly important for the historical land rights of indigenous communities.

- Use of ICTs to Access Culture and Public Services: Millicom’s telecommunications and internet services enable people to access public services and education and exercise their rights to participate in culture. It is important to continue supporting these rights by expanding network coverage to underserved areas to the extent it is technically and financially feasible; upholding quality of service; and ensuring marketing and communications are inclusive.

Key takeaways

- The most salient human rights risks for Millicom’s operations across all three countries are related to privacy and data security, freedom of expression, child safety online, and ethics and corruption.

- Direct access by law enforcement agencies to telecommunications networks is a significant human rights concern globally, and it is rising in South America. While direct access is often, if not always, a condition of spectrum licenses or local law, it considerably reduces Millicom’s leverage to protect the human rights of users.

- Political tension, which may result in social unrest, merits close monitoring and may trigger the reassessment of related human rights risks.

- Millicom has robust policies across all issue areas at both the corporate and country-levels. These policies are designed to prevent and mitigate the human rights issues raised in this assessment. This has been documented in Millicom’s recent GNI assessment process.

- BSR has provided several recommendations to improve Millicom’s mitigation measures for law-enforcement–related privacy and freedom of expression risks. However, it is impossible to perfectly mitigate all human rights risks, and robust implementation and monitoring at the local level is particularly important.

Recommendations for Millicom

Near term

1. Engage with governments on law enforcement relationships, data requests, and surveillance. This can be undertaken in collaboration with multi-stakeholder initiatives. Engagement should be designed to increase transparency on law enforcement relationships and advocate for a human-rights-respecting approach to data requests and surveillance. This is particularly important given the growing trend of law enforcement direct access. Government engagement is one of the only available avenues for Millicom to prevent abuse of direct access for improper surveillance.

2. Engage with governments on content blocking, removal requests and Internet shutdowns. Millicom is already doing this for child sexual abuse content, but engagement could be expanded. This can be undertaken in collaboration with multi-stakeholder initiatives and should be designed to increase transparency around the process for establishing government content blocking and removal requests to the extent permitted by law.

3. Help government actors learn best practices. Undertake shared learning and dialogue with government officials, judges, and law enforcement agencies about best practices in freedom of expression and privacy. This is particularly important for addressing potential law enforcement abuse of direct access.

4. Strengthen privacy and data security. Continue to strengthen Millicom’s privacy and data security policies and practices in relation to law enforcement, customers and partners in accordance with applicable laws.

5. Continue to strengthen ethics and corruption policies and practices. Address how policies and practices are enforced. Review policies on an ongoing basis to ensure they are working and highlight areas for improvement.

6. Apply relevant human rights risk mitigations across countries. Compare existing human rights risk mitigation measures across countries to identify and apply best practices.

Medium term

7. Continue to improve government request processes and controls. This should include ensuring that new team members are adequately trained on processes and controls.

8. Undertake efforts to reduce discrimination risk at Millicom. Discrimination awareness and unconscious bias training is recommended.

9. Support efforts to protect vulnerable groups. Further promote multi-stakeholder approaches to protecting and supporting vulnerable groups such as children, LGBTI+, women and people with disabilities.

10. Integrate human rights into existing ethics, privacy and data security training. This could include a basic intro to business and human rights and a summary of Millicom’s human rights commitments.

Long term

11. Continue to support the advancement of women in technical roles. Continue programs that build the pipeline of women in technical fields and support their advancement.

12. Look for ways to expand access to mobile broadband in underserved areas. Collaborate with national and local governments to expand access to mobile broadband in remote and rural areas.

13. Implement Millicom’s existing responsible advertising guidelines with local offices. Adapt guidelines as needed to fit local norms and regulations.
14. Train staff in how to deal with inappropriate content from Millicom’s operations country-level social media accounts. This may include comments posted to Tigo’s social media pages.

15. Continue to promote safe internet use for children, including through programs like Contigo Conectados and Conectate Segur@.

16. Share insights from this human rights impact assessment with business and non-business stakeholders.

17. Establish human-rights-based requirements for vendors using physical security services for network maintenance and expansion. This should prioritize vendors operating in difficult and conflict-affected environments.

18. Support strong health, safety and security standards and enforcement in network construction and maintenance across the telecommunications industry.
5. South America

Overview
Millicom has operated communications networks in South America for more than 25 years. We provide a wide spectrum of services—including high-speed data, cable TV, voice and SMS, Mobile Financial Services (MFS) and business solutions—in three South American countries. During 2020, we invested a total of US$941 million in the South America and Central America regions to further develop our mobile and fixed communications networks. These investments ensure better bandwidth and quality of Internet experience. They also allow more services and innovation to be built on top of the access that we provide.

We hold the top market position in business-to-consumer (B2C) mobile, B2C home and MFS in Paraguay, and are generally ranked among the top three providers across those services in Colombia and Bolivia. We are an important contributor to our markets in terms of investment, taxes paid, and the employment and services we provide. For more details, see the tables to the right.

Table 2
South America (Bolivia, Colombia and Paraguay)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Mobile customers '000</th>
<th>Customer Relationships(^a) '000</th>
<th>MFS customers '000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>17,563</td>
<td>2,756</td>
<td>2,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legal frameworks
In Bolivia and Paraguay, clear processes and requirements exist for judicial oversight over interception and customer metadata requests. In Colombia, due largely to the long-lasting internal conflicts and war on drugs, the processes are significantly more complex. However, judicial oversight does exist for initiation of interception. Information about the laws and procedures in Colombia is published in detail at https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/policy-issues/legal-frameworks/.

In Bolivia, the use of interception is restricted to exceptional circumstances, such as human and drug trafficking, in which we would receive court orders to activate lines. We have ongoing discussions with authorities regarding the implementation of interception techniques. Procedures in Colombia require us to provide direct access for authorities to our mobile network. Regular audits ensure we do not obtain information about interception that is taking place. We are subject to strong sanctions, including fines, if authorities find that we have gained such information. As a result, we do not possess information regarding how often and for what periods of time communications are intercepted in our mobile networks in Colombia. We also have a significant fixed-network business in Colombia; for these lines, we receive judicial orders, which we review and assess before opening the line for interception to take place. Length of interception is limited by law to a maximum of six months.

In Paraguay, as in Colombia, authorities mandate that we provide direct access to our mobile network. The procedures allow us to view the judicial order required for authorities to initiate the interception, and we are aware when interception occurs. We can file a complaint before the Supreme Court of Justice should we deem that the order or interception does not follow legal requirements.

For customer metadata requests, we receive written orders in all three countries. We assess the legality of these requests before providing authorities with the requested information.

---

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mobile Customers '000</th>
<th>Workforce(^b) '000</th>
<th>Population(^c) '000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>3,920</td>
<td>2,716</td>
<td>11,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>10,025</td>
<td>3,985</td>
<td>50,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>3,618</td>
<td>5,050</td>
<td>7,044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

3 See page 130 in our Annual Report.
4 Total number of households with an active service.
5 Workforce accounts for employees directly employed by Millicom.
6 Population statistics as per World Bank 2019.
Law enforcement requests in 2020

Table 5 shows a decrease in the requests received from law enforcement authorities across our markets in South America. This reflects a reduced level of both criminal and law enforcement activity due to strict lockdowns during 2020 as a result of COVID-19.

This can be seen most clearly in the notable decrease in the number of metadata requests—the most common type of law enforcement request to telecommunications firms.

A number of countries in the region have direct access to our networks. Depending on the type of direct access concerned, this can often mean we are not notified of all instances in which customer communication is being intercepted. The actual written request received by an operation counts as one request in the data tables. A request may seek information about several individuals or devices. Therefore, requests are not equal in magnitude.

The vast majority of requests are in the category of customer metadata. Most of these requests, in turn, seek to confirm the identity behind specific phone numbers. Some requests may ask for information about more than one customer’s mobile phone records (e.g., calls to and from the phone, cell tower location, during a specified time period or within a specific geographic area).

The number of requests that our local operations receive also depends on how many customers we have and our market position. In South America, the percentage of metadata requests received per customer in 2020 was 0.110%, a slight decrease from the 2019 figure.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorities that can request interception or metadata</th>
<th>Authorities that can issue orders for interception</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Judicial authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecuting attorneys, Unit of Financial Investigations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Attorney General’s office and judges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military, police, Prosecutor General, civil servants with judicial or oversight functions, Comptroller General, Attorney General, mayors, and the National Penitentiary and Prison Institute (INPEC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Criminal Courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Prosecutor’s Office, Criminal Courts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South America</th>
<th>Interception</th>
<th>MFS</th>
<th>Metadata</th>
<th>Metadata requests per customer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>19,333</td>
<td>0.110%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>24,864</td>
<td>0.157%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>22,590</td>
<td>0.154%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21,492</td>
<td>0.150%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>22,521</td>
<td>0.103%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>24,447</td>
<td>0.115%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Central America

Overview
Millicom has operated in the Central America region for more than 25 years. We provide a wide range of services including high-speed data, cable TV, voice and SMS, Mobile Financial Services (MFS) and business solutions in six different markets. During 2020, Millicom invested a total of US$941 million in the South America and Central America regions to further develop our mobile and fixed communications networks. These investments ensure better bandwidth and quality of Internet experience. They also allow more services and innovation to be built on top of the access that we provide.

We hold the top market position for many services across the region. Also, we are an important contributor to our markets in terms of investment, taxes paid,\(^7\) and the employment and services we provide.

We are now reporting across our entire footprint in the region (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and Panama) after several acquisitions in recent years. We had previously only catered to enterprise clients and a very small number of cable TV and DTH customers in Nicaragua until mid-2019, when we closed a transaction for the takeover of Telefonica’s mobile business in the country. We also completed the takeover of Cable Onda and Telefonica’s assets in Panama in December 2018 and September 2019 respectively. All numbers related to these businesses are now fully included in our reporting.

Legal frameworks
Due to challenging security environments—including high levels of organized crime and drug-trafficking-related violence—governments in Central America have enacted some of the most-developed laws and technical surveillance requirements. In Costa Rica, where we operate fixed networks only, the number of law enforcement requests is significantly lower than in other Central American markets.

Table 6
Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and Panama)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Mobile customers '000</th>
<th>Customer Relationships(^6) '000</th>
<th>MFS customers '000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24,172</td>
<td>1,789</td>
<td>2,556</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mobile Customers '000</th>
<th>Workforce(^9)</th>
<th>Population(^10) '000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>5,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2,685</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>6,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>11,416</td>
<td>3,201</td>
<td>16,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>3,493</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>6,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>4,620</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>9,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1,957</td>
<td>2,623</td>
<td>4,246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) See page 130 in our Annual Report.
\(^2\) Total number of households with an active service.
\(^3\) Workforce accounts for employees directly employed by Millicom.
\(^10\) Population statistics as per World Bank 2019.
\(^11\) Millicom does not have mobile operations in Costa Rica but does have B2C home and B2B services, in which it is the market leader.
6. Central America—continued

In Honduras and El Salvador, the law mandates direct access to our networks by authorities. However, the laws in both countries specify which authorities can request interception, and the actual interception orders can only be granted by the courts (see Table 8). As these are direct-access regimes, we do not receive these orders; nor do we have visibility into how often or for what periods of time interception takes place. In El Salvador, the law also lists the types of specific crimes to which interception can be applied in addition to other requirements. In Guatemala and Panama, interception also takes place under judicial orders, which we receive and review before opening the line for the specified time period. In Nicaragua, there is no live interception system in place. For customer metadata, judicial orders from the same courts are required in all of our markets in Central America. We receive and review these requests before we provide the authorities with the requested information.

In El Salvador and Honduras, special laws require telecommunications operators to block signals in and out of prisons. Similar laws had previously existed in Guatemala, while Costa Rica recently introduced legislation in this area. See section 8 for a more extensive overview of prison signal blocking in the region.

We are not compensated for the resources required to assess and process requests from law enforcement in any of our markets. Given the challenging security situation in numerous Central American countries, these resources are extensive and must be available to respond to requests at all times.

Law enforcement requests in 2020

Law enforcement authorities across our markets in Central America continue to tackle crime and violence in the region. These countries rank among the most violent in the world. Notorious transnational criminal gangs involved in activities ranging from drug smuggling to human trafficking are largely responsible for the violence afflicting these countries. Surveillance and customer data requests underpin law enforcement authorities’ efforts to combat these serious challenges from organized crime. Differences in the populations of our Central American and South American markets add to the difficulty of making direct comparisons from one region to the other. Also, as mentioned previously, law enforcement requests are not all equal in magnitude, which further complicates any attempt to make direct comparisons.

As shown in Table 9, request types have gradually increased over the years. That said, recent acquisitions make direct comparisons to previous years difficult. Certain requests may involve a large number of metadata records, which can skew the numbers. This year, as in South America, requests for metadata would have fallen from previous years (due to the aforementioned reasons linked to COVID-19) were it not for our newly acquired assets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central America</th>
<th>Interception</th>
<th>MFS</th>
<th>Metadata</th>
<th>Metadata requests per customer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1,555</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>14,870</td>
<td>0.058%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>12,633</td>
<td>0.072%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1,533</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>11,278</td>
<td>0.064%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>10,848</td>
<td>0.060%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>16,758</td>
<td>0.099%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>8,653</td>
<td>0.052%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since 2017, we had been providing more specific details about the types and sources of requests received in one unnamed country. Since then, this country (Colombia) has been producing its own transparency report with these details. Therefore, we will no longer be replicating this information in our LED report. This year, we have instead decided to include a specific section related to COVID-19, given the pertinence of the topic and its related impact on our law enforcement engagement.

**Types of requests related to COVID-19**

We witnessed a wide range of requests from governments to help address public health challenges related to COVID-19 (see Table 10 for details). These included push SMS notifications and the use of media and advertising space for public health messaging; and requests for support in efforts related to contact-tracing and identification of vulnerable populations for distribution of relief funds. Although the objectives and motives behind the latter request types arguably made these logical, pragmatic and understandable, we were compelled to push back in circumstances where we believed protections for the privacy and security of our customers could be undermined in the long term.

These were not easy decisions, and we often risked damaging relations with our stakeholders in government who were desperately seeking solutions to address a crisis like no other experienced in our lifetime. We offered our services and support in many other ways—for example, by using our Mobile Financial Services platform to distribute funds to vulnerable populations—but we could not agree to providing our customer database to other governments that needed to correctly identify which parts of the population needed such funds most urgently. We hope that this information helps provide some detail on these types of challenges and will improve understanding of the types of situations faced during this pandemic.

Similar to our decision not to publish country-level data for our law enforcement requests, we are choosing to maintain this regional-level split for these requests given the sensitivity involved in certain cases. We do describe some of these cases in our Major Events section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>SMS notifications</th>
<th>Media/ advertising space</th>
<th>Geolocation requests</th>
<th>Customer database requests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Major events are requests that fall outside the three types of law enforcement assistance covered in previous sections of this report. All local operations are required to escalate these events to global management and take steps to minimize the effect of such events on our services and on our customers’ rights to FoE and privacy. The events described in this section were reported to global headquarters in 2020.

Deciding whether to challenge a major event is rarely simple. These requests often have a legal basis, although the events frequently stem from broad national-security-related powers.

Major events include:

- Requests for shutdown of specific base station sites, geographic areas or an entire network
- Service denial or restriction (SMS, mobile/ fixed Internet, social media channels)
- Interception requests outside of due process
- Targeted take down or blocking of specific content
- Denial of access for specific individuals
- Significant changes related to surveillance techniques or operational processes (how local surveillance laws are implemented in practice)
- Significant changes to local laws related to government powers of surveillance or data retention
- Requests to send politically motivated messages to customers on behalf of the government

In 2020, we recorded 15 major events, an increase compared with 2019 but largely in line with the range witnessed in previous years, as shown in Table 11. Eleven of the events occurred in Africa, three in Central America and one in South America.

Year-to-year comparisons of our major events are difficult, given that we have divested from a number of operations in Africa while refocusing our capital and efforts on existing and new markets in Latin America. Given the significant proportion of major events in the Africa region, however, we have chosen to include those events in this section.

As with law enforcement requests, the ICT sector has no accepted or standardized definitions for different types of major events or how to account for them.

Millicom counts the number of requests made directly to us as well as events that have consequences or implications to our services and the rights of our customers. We count the event regardless of whether or not our engagement was successful in preventing it. One request may include a shutdown of several different services or parts of the network in several different geographic areas. If we receive a request to extend a previous shutdown, we count this as a new event.

Table 11
Type of major event

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of major event</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shutdown or restriction of services</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal for significant changes in local laws</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal for significant changes in technical or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operational procedures</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disproportionate customer data or interception</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>requests</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically motivated messages</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, in the case of a request to shut down cell towers around prisons in Central America, we count one request per country instead of the number of prisons or cell towers involved. In the case of prison shutdowns that are ongoing with no significant changes in terms of obligations or requirements, we do not count this as an additional event; for 2020, we recorded no major events in this area. Although we do not report ongoing signal blocking in prisons (or new blocking measures that do not impact our business directly) as a major event, we consider this a significant issue and continue to provide details on its implications and our work to mitigate risks and threats to FoE.

We have clear guidelines for our subsidiaries on handling major events in addition to escalating the information to the global team for assistance. For some of the events below, we are unable to describe how we reduce the impact of these events on our customers’ privacy or FoE. However, we have shared such information in different multi-stakeholder forums such as the GNI.

12 With the exception of blocking child sexual abuse content.
8. Major events in 2020—continued

**Shutdowns or restriction of services**

When we receive requests for shutdowns or service restrictions, we must consider direct consequences for our local operation and management if sanctions defined by law are applied. Sanctions may include fines, imprisonment or removal of a license to operate communications networks. Requests for shutdowns or service restrictions often happen during a particularly volatile time, which means we must also consider the safety of our staff as well as potential retaliation from the general public against our company and our visible assets, such as shops and base station sites.

**Africa**

Although we have not received any Internet shutdown orders in Africa, we continue to deal with content takedown. Where possible, we have always carefully reviewed and discussed takedown requests that are not related to child sexual abuse content. We have consistently flagged such events and sent them through our robust escalation process. This demonstrates how seriously our staff adheres to Millicom’s internal guidelines.

During a sensitive electoral year in Tanzania, we experienced a number of extraordinary requests from the authorities. As was widely reported in the press, a number of services were blocked or throttled in the period leading up to the vote and ceased several days after the election results were announced. Many of these services do not fall within our remit, and the authorities are often able to act independently of the telecommunications firms in this area.

**Informing customers of shutdowns**

In our markets, mobile services are primarily pre-paid and our customers interact with a large distribution base that consists of individual entrepreneurs and small convenience stores. We meet with our sales force daily to inform them of new promotions, products or other relevant issues. This enables us to carry messages to customers through our sales force even when our services are affected.

In the event of government-mandated service disruption, we do our best to notify customers that we are dealing with a situation beyond our control. In most cases, our customers know why services are not available.

**Ongoing shutdown of services in prisons in Central America**

Since 2014, authorities in El Salvador and Honduras have enacted laws that oblige all telecommunications operators to shut down services or reduce signal capacity in and around prisons, where the authorities suspect criminal gangs continue to operate by using smuggled cell phones. Guatemala enacted similar laws in 2014, but the relevant legislation was overturned in the Supreme Court in 2015. Costa Rica also introduced new signal-blocking measures in 2018, but we do not have mobile operations in the country. We have assisted with monitoring and advocacy work performed by organizations such as the GSMA and ASIET and will continue working with these organizations on these topics.

In Central America, where prisons are often located in urban areas, actions such as removing antennas, shutting down base station towers and installing signal jammers can affect mobile service for people living near the correctional facilities. For example, ATM use may be disrupted. Sanctions for non-compliance with these lawful orders include substantial fines and the possible revocation of licenses.

We continue to engage with local authorities and industry peers on finding alternative ways to address signal blocking in and around prisons that do not affect nearby residents. These alternatives include new network coverage designs around prisons, third-party solutions that block signals in specific physical areas, and relocation of prisons to less densely populated areas.

Millicom underwent an external assessment of our case study on prison signal blocking in the Central America region as part of the GNI Assessment process. The GNI Public Assessment Report includes a description of this case study.

**El Salvador**

El Salvador approved an Anti-Extortion Law in April 2015 that prohibits any telecommunications signal inside a prison. This legislation established daily fines of up to US$900,000 for non-compliance and authorized the government to revoke the license of any telecommunications operator that receives five fines within a year.

As violence in the country peaked in early 2016, the National Congress approved a law that allowed the government to take specific and drastic actions related to at least seven prisons if telecommunications operators did not block their signals in the vicinity. In 2018, the Legislative Assembly’s Security Commission reformed the “Penitentiary Law” to make signal blocking a permanent mechanism. Because of this legislation, Millicom and other operators had to shut down base station towers not only near the prisons but also in surrounding areas, leaving part of the population without service. Our company has since narrowed the scope of our blocking measures to help mitigate FoE impacts for nearby customers.

Immediately after the government enforced these extraordinary measures, we informed our customers about the shutdowns and their possible implications on our services, explaining that we are obligated to comply with the measures related to national security efforts.

Telecommunications operators in El Salvador continue to work with the new government authorities, which changed in June 2019 when President Bukele took office, to reduce and minimize the service impacts. A joint working group has been established with the authorities in order to monitor progress and the functioning of jammers in prisons. Operators are also donating additional equipment to monitor and locate devices within prisons.

Honduras

On January 2014, the National Congress of Honduras passed a law requiring operators to block any telecommunications signal from reaching the country’s prisons.

The sanction for non-compliance is approximately US$40,000 for the first instance and approximately US$80,000 for the second, while a third violation can result in license termination. In 2014, operators turned off several antennas to comply with the law, leaving some users in large cities without service. Operators have yet to find a blocking solution that limits the effects on people outside a prison but also does not allow prison guards to turn off the jammers.

In 2016, we had to extend signal blocking to three additional prisons and improve the effectiveness of previously installed jammers. CONATEL, the Honduran telecommunications regulator, sent written notification about a sanctioning process after running tests at one of the prisons where CONATEL had detected a signal that permitted outgoing calls. In January 2017, both Tigo and the country’s other large operator, Claro, were served with sanctions for outgoing calls. We are still disputing this sanction in the courts. The situation has remained much the same throughout the last few years.

Disproportionate customer data or interception requests

As outlined in the previous section on COVID-19 requests, we experienced some extraordinary requests related to efforts to address the public health crisis. These included requests from certain governments to access our customer databases to better understand their populations and distribute relief funds more effectively. In Colombia, a request like this was received from DANE, the government’s statistical agency, by all major operators via the local Telecoms Chamber Asomovil.

We sent a letter to DANE as Asomovil, GSMA, and separately as TIGO, outlining our reasons for not complying with this request. These included privacy concerns and DANE’s lack of legal jurisdiction for requesting the data. DANE responded by reiterating the need to comply, but we remained steadfast in not providing this information.

Proposals for significant changes in operational procedures or local laws

Local laws strictly prohibit Millicom from disclosing details of proposed changes in law enforcement procedures, such as changes to operational procedures of law enforcement assistance. These procedures define how local laws regarding such assistance are implemented in practice and detail how day-to-day requests from law enforcement are made and handled.

Regulators and legislators continue to scrutinize local legal frameworks and operational procedures in many of our operating markets. Building off a previous trend, major events that we recorded during 2020 involved a new cybercrime bill in Nicaragua and content regulations in Tanzania.

We engage with local authorities to develop laws through an open and consultative process. Our most frequent request to legislators is that they establish judicial oversight, promote proportionate and necessary measures, and be as narrow, clear and detailed as possible regarding which authorities can make requests under the law and how the law requires us to respond. We often find that legislators struggle to understand the roles and limitations of different players in the ICT ecosystem. As a result, legislators often assign requirements to telecommunications companies that can only be carried out by providers of specific services.

We also do not agree that telecommunications operators should bear the cost of implementing technical and operational measures for interception, as is frequently proposed by governments. In our view, sharing these costs will help encourage the proportionate use of such powers.

Nicaragua

Late in 2020, the FSLN-controlled national assembly passed a law that makes spreading fake news through “information and communication technologies” punishable by up to four years in prison.

It follows other bills such as a “foreign agents’ law” and “life-imprisonment bill” as well as moves against various media outlets.

The Ciberdelitos law has the declared objective of “providing a legal framework for the prevention, investigation, prosecution and sanctioning of crimes committed through information and communication technologies.” Under the bill, people convicted of crimes such as fraud, cyber-espionage, or use of the Internet to corrupt minors or for child pornography would face punishments of two to 10 years in prison.

The provision that has attracted significant media coverage is Article 30, which would allow sentences of two to four years for “the publication or dissemination of false (or) distorted information which produces alarm, fear or distress among the public.”

Tanzania

In July, the government issued new Online Content Regulations that apply to online content service providers, Internet service providers, application services licensees, online content users and any other related online content. The regulations include broad rules covering:

- License categories
- License application procedure
- Obligations of online content service providers
- Online content users and hosts
- Prohibited content
- Complaints and penalties

General obligations for licensees include, but are not limited to:

- Obligation to use moderating tools to filter prohibited content, identify the source of the content and take corrective measures
- Upon being ordered by the TCRA, obligation to immediately remove prohibited content (in the event that the TCRA decides to request removal rather than performing removal itself)
- Obligation to refrain from accessing, storing, keeping, publishing, circulating or broadcasting any prohibited content

8. Major events in 2020—continued
9. Trends and priorities for 2021

Trends in our operating environment
As noted previously, the number of major events in our markets increased in 2020. Significant changes in our business over the past few years, such as exiting and consolidating various operations in Africa while expanding in Latin America, make year-to-year trend analysis difficult. We continued to experience a large majority of Major Events in the Africa region during 2020, driven by a contentious electoral year. We remain alert to numerous security issues and political challenges in countries where we operate. We continue working with local authorities to improve transparency and accountability as well as to educate authorities about the need for proportionate action.

New frameworks concerning cybercrime and content regulation—trends highlighted in our previous LED reports—continued to emerge. These types of events are likely to increase as governments seek to understand how new technologies can help them in their national security efforts.

Unfortunately, we sometimes see legislative proposals copied directly from other jurisdictions without proper consultation in a multi-stakeholder forum. Through our work with the GNI, we aim to demonstrate that this type of interaction, with all actors working on joint solutions, is the most effective way to understand and satisfy the demands and wishes of the populace as well as the governments.

Prison shutdowns remain a significant challenge in the Central America region. Although we had no major events related to this issue in recent years, signal-blocking measures in Central America continue to be a focus for industry advocacy efforts with new measures under discussion in Panama now also.

We aim to redouble our efforts with other stakeholders in civil society to continue drawing international attention to signal-blocking issues. We have discussed this topic and shared best practices with our industry peers on several occasions. We have also continued our work on this topic as a policy focus area for the GNI, and we remain encouraged by the potential of this group to help address the issue. Millicom supported the GNI in its work to produce a one-page guide for policymakers and government officials to ensure they fully understand the consequences of network shutdowns. The #KeepItOn campaign by Access Now also continues to play an important role in highlighting these events by aggregating information about shutdowns and building awareness.

Capacity of local law enforcement
Most requests we receive outside of the established legal process tend to stem from certain law enforcement officials’ incomplete understanding of the laws and/or technical operations. In our view, some local law enforcement authorities also lack the capacity, resources and knowledge to understand the ICT ecosystem. This deficit, coupled with inadequate access to the latest cyber-investigation methods, can lead to requests that we are unable to carry out or that are disproportionate to the issue the authorities are trying to address.

A common example is when authorities issue a request related to content that we do not hold, such as content on social media services like YouTube, WhatsApp or Facebook. Such data is held outside of the requesting jurisdiction, and complex mutual legal assistance treaties make its prompt retrieval difficult for local law enforcement agencies.

We meet regularly with law enforcement agencies regarding disproportionate or overreaching requests and proposals to help educate agencies about the complexities involved. We always work to provide best practices from other countries where we have successfully negotiated safeguards in interception processes. Examples include independent oversight, narrow and focused orders for legitimate purposes only, strict time limits, and the ability to verify that the correct authorized individual or team is carrying out the request.

Advocating for clear laws
Clear laws and processes are crucial for telecommunications companies in respecting the privacy and FoE of our customers. We operate local subsidiaries that are bound by local laws and do not have the option of selecting the laws with which we will comply. Therefore, we advocate for clearer laws—which respect international conventions and narrowly define who, how and under what circumstances law enforcement requests can be made—even when achieving the desired end result may require more time. We consider such clarity to be a core instrument in promoting the proportionate use of law enforcement powers. Clear laws also help us more easily assess the legality of requests, which benefits both the privacy and FoE rights of citizens. In addition, clarity helps make law enforcement processes more efficient and allows us to successfully challenge requests that do not comply with the applicable law.

We welcome additional technical assistance from the international community and other sources as we strive to include human rights considerations in cyber investigations. Assistance from these stakeholders also helps in designing transparent and clear laws around surveillance that incorporate international human rights principles.
Priorities for 2021
We will continue our engagement efforts with all stakeholder groups around issues of FoE and privacy. In addition, we will further promote related internal guidance by continuously monitoring the effectiveness of our existing guidelines and procedures related to law enforcement assistance. We continue to review and update our guidance to local operations, such as the in-person training sessions that occurred in specific countries throughout 2020. We performed two training sessions in Panama, first with the new Cable Onda team and subsequently in a joint session with both the Cable Onda and Telefonica teams, which now work together following our acquisitions. We also held a similar session with new and existing employees in Nicaragua following the acquisition of Telefonica’s assets there. Likewise, we held a training session with a new senior team member in Bolivia.

We take compliance with our internal procedures seriously; on rare occasions we have sanctioned employees who did not follow our guidelines and controls. This reflects the natural evolution of our maturity process and our robust framework for protecting privacy and FoE.

We continue to attend major civil society events and promote the need for further safeguards on human rights in international development aid and financial assistance. We also continue to promote the need for human rights-based technical support for legislators and law enforcement entities in our regions. Most importantly, we continue speaking directly with relevant government agencies whenever possible.

We look forward to building upon our multi-stakeholder interactions to continue our important work on FoE and privacy issues, which remain at the forefront of human rights, FoE and privacy through the HRIA process. This has allowed for greater cross-pollination of best practices and standards among our local operations.

Finally, we have launched a privacy policy framework in accordance with applicable laws and an internal platform for employees. We also launched a privacy section on our external website, which we will continue to develop so that all users can consult all our privacy-related policies and commitments along with related materials and interactive tools.